The Wound and the Crown

Preface

This is the first of two essays that are not an attempt to explain evil away, or to reduce providence to a formula that removes mystery. They are an invitation to consider how a good God can create a world with a genuine wound in it, and govern that world without either overriding its freedom or abandoning it to itself.


The Wrong Question

Ask many people why a good God permits evil, and they will answer as though the question had only one possible form. God could have made a perfect world. This world is not perfect, so something has gone wrong.

That assumption needs to be examined before we accept it. It suggests an answer to a prior question none of us voiced: what sort of creation would a good God make in the first place? A finished world that later broke? Or a world still on its way to the glory for which it was made?

We should admit, before going further, that not every "why" receives an answer. Job asked this question in its oldest form and was answered with a whirlwind, a vision of things too vast and too strange for him to understand. We inherit the same limit. What follows offers a shape and a direction, though the mystery itself remains standing.

Within the Christian tradition, two great ways of imagining creation have developed. Their long conversation has more to teach us than either account taken alone. A later synthesis suggests these two visions need not be rivals.

Before asking why evil exists, we must first ask what sort of world God was creating.

Two Kinds of Lack

We start with a distinction more basic than any theology: not all absence is the same kind of absence.

An acorn, planted, lacks branches, bark, height, and the whole architecture of an oak. Nothing has gone wrong. It is exactly what an acorn is meant to be at this stage. Its lack is the shape of its becoming.

A branch snapped by a storm lacks the wholeness proper to a living oak. Here the lack is not a stage but a failure. The tree is now less than the kind of tree it should be, not on its way to becoming more.

Call the first kind "incompleteness", and the second "woundedness". They are not the same thing. An acorn is not a damaged oak. A wounded oak is not simply an oak that has not finished growing.

Confusing them creates a double error, and Christian thought has fallen into both. Treat every lack as woundedness, and growth itself starts to look like failure; a fall built into creation from its first page. Treat every lack as incompleteness, and real failure starts to look like just another stage on the way to something better, which is cold comfort to anyone standing within the wound. Keep the distinction, and each lack can be named for what it is, rather than flattened into whichever category happens to be theologically convenient.

The distinction, though, is conceptual rather than chronological. In the world we now inhabit, incompleteness and woundedness are already intertwined, and by the end of our enquiry we will return to this distinction and find that completion and healing finally belong together.

Two Great Christian Visions

Augustine and Irenaeus are usually presented as rivals. They are better understood as two witnesses answering different concerns. One of the richest expressions of their complementarity appears centuries later in Maximus the Confessor, whose vision of humanity's vocation in Christ informs much of what follows.

Augustine asks why humanity is wounded. His answer runs through privation. Evil is not a thing in its own right but a corruption of some created good, a wound in something that was once whole. Adam's fall wounds a creation already good, though not yet complete, and history becomes the long labour of restoring what was lost. Augustine's gift to the tradition is his refusal to soften the wound into a mere stage. Evil is genuinely evil.

Irenaeus asks why creation is unfinished. His answer runs through growth. Adam was created not defective but capable of growth into the destiny prepared for him. From the beginning, both he and creation were called to full communion with God. History instead becomes the long labour of creation growing into that destiny. Irenaeus's gift to Christianity is his refusal to treat creation's becoming as a defect. Creation, on his account, was never intended to arrive complete on the first day. Paradise marked the beginning of humanity's vocation. Our communion with God always lay beyond Eden's innocence.

Irenaeus's own argument, though, is more modest than the theodicy sometimes built on his name: a later, more systematic claim that suffering itself is necessary to forge virtue, without which souls remain shallow. Our debt is to the older, more modest Irenaeus: growth through communion, not suffering as a necessary curriculum; a travail to be redeemed, not a lesson to be learned.

Neither account, taken alone, covers all the evidence. Augustine's account leaves difficult questions once suffering is recognised as preceding humanity itself, something we return to when evolution enters the picture. Irenaeus, taken alone, can drift toward treating tragedy as only an unfinished chapter, which is cold comfort at a graveside or hospital bed. Together they illuminate different dimensions of the same mystery.

Creation's destiny was always glory. The wound belongs to the road, not the destination. The Christian tradition has often pictured that destiny as coronation, the fulfilment of what creation was always meant to become.

Development and Vocation

The harder question is why humanity's incompleteness should differ from the acorn's at all. An acorn cannot refuse to become an oak. Its becoming is written into it; it has no other way to go. Why should Adam's incompleteness have been any different?

Adam's becoming was not only developmental. It was vocational.

A vocation is a calling. It can be answered or refused. It does not exist because something is defective, but because something already good has been invited toward a greater good. Adam's incompleteness was never a flaw awaiting correction. He was created good. It was a beginning awaiting an answer.

Answering, or refusing, requires a kind of creature the acorn is not: one that reasons and is free. This is what the language of the image of God was reaching for. Not just reason as a tool for survival, but reason and freedom together: the capacity to recognise a good and to choose it, or refuse.

The same conviction runs through later Catholic reflection on the human person as gift, called to give himself or herself freely rather than only to function. A creature's dignity lies precisely in being able to answer a call rather than blindly execute a nature. The capacity to answer a vocation is not the same as its exercise. An infant, or a mind dimmed by age or disability, does not cease to bear the image of God because it cannot, for the moment, answer. The dignity lies in being addressable at all, not in the moment of the answer.

Every other creature develops. Only a rational creature can be summoned, and only a summoned creature can assent or refuse. That is the line dividing Adam's incompleteness from the acorn's, and from every other creature. The Fall is best named as a refused vocation, humanity turning down a calling it might have kept.

This should not be understood as though the refusal were somehow scripted, a stage God's plan required. Nothing about calling something a vocation makes its failure inevitable. The refusal was a real possibility, and it was genuinely taken. That is what makes it a fall rather than a stage, and Adam a creature rather than a mechanism.

Evolution and the Problem of Natural Evil

Evolution did not create the problem of natural evil. It exposed a hidden assumption in one particular way of telling the Christian story. That story assumes every natural process capable of causing suffering must trace back to a human crime that set it in motion. Yet, predation, disease, and extinction all precede any creature capable of committing that crime. Whatever explains them cannot simply be human guilt, since there was no human guilt yet to explain them.

Here Augustine is primarily answering the woundedness question, and natural evil, for the most part, is not that question. A world of change is, by its nature, a world of decay; a world with real causes of its own is one in which some of those causes will fail, collide, and consume one another. Aquinas saw something important here: a universe of genuine secondary causes is one where things truly act and are acted upon rather than puppets moved directly by the divine hand. Such a universe more fully reflects the richness of creation, even though individual creatures within it will suffer and perish as a result.

A world with real weather has storms. A world with real causality has causes that fail.

Honesty requires marking the limit of this argument. That a world of real causes will include suffering is one claim; that it must include suffering of this severity is another. The first does not establish the second; a parasite that slowly consumes a living host from within seems built to fail cruelly. That gap is real. A fawn burned alive in a forest fire never had Adam's vocation to betray.

This groaning, then, is not something the Fall caused, but neither is it something the Fall leaves untouched. Human refusal does not originate creation's decay; that decay was already real, the shadow side of a world of genuine causes, before any human stood to refuse anything. But refusal adds its own grief, a further and distinct sorrow layered upon the world's original suffering. The two griefs are related but not identical, and Augustine and Irenaeus answer to each in turn: Irenaeus to the groaning that was always there, Augustine to the grief human refusal has since added. In lived experience, though, the two are rarely so easily distinguished. The storm that destroys a home and the neighbour who refuses to help are felt as one weight, not two.

That does not require natural processes to be a punishment, only that they remain incomplete, not yet arrived, groaning rather than guilty.

None of this, though, makes the suffering weigh less. Removing guilt from predation and disease does not make them easier to bear, and nothing here claims that it does. Incompleteness explains why such pain exists in a world made by a good God without making God the author of evil or the accuser of its victims. It does not, on its own, make the agony good. That is exactly why Paul does not end with an explanation. He ends with a groan, and with the hope of being set free.

Romans 8 no longer needs to sound like collateral damage from a human crime. It can now be read as Paul presents it: creation awaiting its liberation.

Job asks the hardest question directly, and receives nothing like the explanation he sought. He receives a whirlwind, and page after page of creatures that seem to have no obvious bearing on his torment, but a vision of a world larger than the question he had brought to it. God asks where Job was when the foundations of the earth were laid, and Job discovers not that his question was wrong, but that it could not be answered from where he stood. God does not explain away the suffering; He leaves the mystery standing, and the Book of Job ends without resolving it.

Christian hope, however, does not end where Job ends. Paul's groaning creation is no more explained than Job's pain. But the New Testament refuses to leave the groan in the whirlwind. It gives it a direction.

One question remains. If natural suffering predates humanity and owes nothing to human sin, why does Paul say creation waits on humanity at all, rather than simply on its own unfolding?

Christ and Recapitulation

Paul calls Christ the "last Adam". Where the first Adam was called and refused, the last Adam was called and answered, all the way, including when the calling cost Him everything.

The refusal in the Garden was never simply the breaking of a rule, as though Adam's sin were a technical infraction requiring a technical remedy. It was the failure of humanity to become what it had been called to become: to trust rather than grasp, to answer a gift with a gift rather than with suspicion. Christ's obedience then, embraced in another Garden, is not just compensation offered to balance an account. It is humanity finally reaching, in Him, the vocation it had been offered from the beginning and had failed to fulfil.

This obedience is not offered from outside suffering. Christ does not complete the vocation Adam left unanswered from a safe distance above it; He completes it from within the very condition Adam's refusal left behind: subject to decay, to abandonment, and to a death He did not deserve. The cry from the cross, "Why have you forsaken me?", is not staged. It is asked from the heart of the very darkness creation has been groaning under since before Adam existed. God does not survey the groan and pronounce it finished. In the human nature He assumed, God enters it and is forsaken within it, so that the cry is no longer creation's alone to carry. This is solidarity. The Word does not cease to be God in taking up a nature that can suffer. He does suffer. He is forsaken.

But solidarity alone would be companionship in the wound, not its healing. Something more than presence has to be true of this suffering if it is to close the gap Adam left open.

The wound heals not through a separate act of reparation, but because humanity's calling is at last realised in Christ. The wound exists because that vocation remained unanswered. In Him, all things are brought together, and humanity is restored to what it was meant to become. In Christ, healing finds its completion.

Here our opening distinction finally resolves: healing and completion prove to be a single act, not two.

The shape of the refusal and the shape of the answer are mirror images of one another, and Paul draws the mirror himself. The serpent promised that eating the fruit would make Adam and Eve like God: godhood seized on their own terms, grasped at rather than given. Paul's hymn in Philippians says the opposite about Christ. Though He was in the form of God, He did not count equality with God something to be grasped, but emptied Himself and became obedient.

Adam, already given likeness to God as a gift, reached to seize it as possession. Christ, already possessing the equality Adam reached for, received His mission as gift, even to death. One is the story of a hand closing around a gift as though it were a possession. The other is the story of a hand opening to receive what can only ever be given. Christ's obedience does more than cancel Adam's disobedience. It fulfils Adam's vocation. Reception. Gift met with gift.

Adam's calling, though, was never simply individual. Humanity stood within creation as its representative, not because creation was otherwise silent. The Psalms already summon sun and moon, mountains and seas to praise their Maker. Only a creature endowed with reason and freedom could knowingly receive creation as gift and return it in thanksgiving. The rest of creation glorifies God by being what it is; humanity alone can consciously offer creation back to its Creator in praise.

For this reason, a strand of Christian thought, running through the Greek Fathers, and above all Maximus the Confessor, speaks of Adam as priest before he is ruler, gathering creation, consciously and freely, into the praise its Maker is owed; the first labour of a City not yet built.

Creation's waiting was never itself blameworthy. What Adam's refusal left missing was the voice by which creation was to answer; the voice creation had been waiting to hear.

And because Adam's calling was never only personal, neither is Christ's answering of it. Paul does not stop at the redemption of persons. He goes on to creation itself, waiting, yearning, and now to be set free. Creation's liberation belongs to the same recapitulating act by which humanity reaches its vocation. The one redemption unfolds at different scales. Humanity reaches what it was called to be. Creation, carried by humanity's vocation from the beginning, reaches what it was always moving towards.

Augustine illuminates the wound. Irenaeus illuminates creation's growth. The Cross reveals God's solidarity within suffering, and the Resurrection opens creation's hope. Together they form successive chapters in one drama, each answering a different question about the same mystery.

The mystery of evil is not resolved, nor does Christianity pretend that every "why" has been answered. What it claims instead is that the shape of redemption has been revealed, and that its ending allows the earlier chapters to be read aright.

The Christian answer to evil is therefore not a single explanation but a story whose parts become fully intelligible only when read together.

Conclusion: The Wound and the Crown

Return to the question we opened with: would a good God make a perfect world, or a world still becoming?

Christianity refuses the choice. Creation was truly unfinished. It was always moving towards its fulfilment. Humanity's refusal introduced a genuine wound into that history, and Christ recapitulated what Adam left undone in the very act that completed humanity's vocation.

God permits evil because He chose to create a world capable of genuine becoming and genuine freedom, not because evil is good, nor because any particular grief was ever willed for its own sake. Having freely chosen this world, with its own order and history, divine wisdom orders that history not by necessity but by what is fitting. God does not abandon it when evil enters; He redeems it from within, remaining faithful to the work of His own hands.

The Crown is the fulfilment for which creation was always destined. It does not erase the wound. It transfigures it, not because the wound was ever necessary, but because redemption perfects history rather than abolishing it.

Scripture is precise about the difference. The risen Christ does not appear scar-free. He shows Thomas His hands and His side, and invites a finger into the wound itself. The wounds are not hidden as an embarrassment to glory; they are carried into glory as its most eloquent witnesses. That is what it means for the Crown to transfigure the wound rather than erase it: not a glory that pretends the wound never happened, but a glory great enough to hold the wound within itself and still be glory.

It is the destiny towards which creation was always ordered, reached at last through a refusal answered by obedience: a creation wounded by grasping, restored through receiving, and brought in Christ to the glory for which it was made.

Scripture itself preserves that pattern. It begins in a Garden where a gift was seized like a possession and ends in a City where every gift is finally received in thanksgiving, and God is all in all.

Sources and Further Reading

Scripture: Genesis 1–3; Job 38–42; Romans 5 and 8; Philippians 2; Colossians 1; John 20. https://www.biblegateway.com/versions/New-Revised-Standard-Version-Catholic-Edition-NRSVCE-Bible/

Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity (especially on evil as privation).
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1302.htm

Irenaeus, Against Heresies (especially Book IV, chapter 38, on humanity's growth into the likeness of God).
https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, questions 47–48 (on creation and the nature of evil).
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/

Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua (especially Ambiguum 7, on humanity's vocation as the mediator of creation).
https://archive.org/details/ambigua0000maxi/page/n7/mode/2up

John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body (on humanity's vocation to self-gift).
https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences.index.html

 

Comments

  1. Another thought-provoking essay. I think the comparison between the acorn, that which cannot be other than what it is, and a human, who can choose - to an extent - what to be, is interesting. Is there a value judgement to be made here? Would an oak tree be a better oak tree if the acorn chose to grow into an oak tree? Where does that leave a being like God, who has no 'choice' other than to be who he is?

    I wonder about the idea of lacking. Does an acorn really need to become an oak tree to be complete? Most acorns never germinate. And if an acorn does germinate, when does it obtain completeness? When it first shoots? As a sapling? When it's 100 years old? 200? In the same way, I don't think that we'd look at a newborn and say it's a shame that it's lacking the completeness of adulthood (again, in an organic being whose form is continually in flux, when does that occur?) I'm not sure that the potential for metamorphosis implies incompleteness in an earlier stage. Spiritually, Christ spoke highly of the faith of little children, so can we say that they are any less spiritually complete than someone who's been knocked around by a lifetime of suffering? Perhaps everything is complete as it is, where it is.

    I think that the problem with all theodicies is that they may do a good job of offering a rationale for the world being the way it is, but they can't answer 'why' the world has to be that way. While it may be true that suffering and free will are prerequisites for spiritual growth in this world, there's really no convincing answer as to why that has to be the case given all possible worlds. In the same way that we can understand that an oak tree has to begin life as an acorn given the physical laws that govern this world, that doesn't explain why we can't have a world where oak trees reproduce by splitting in half and both halves walking off to new locations.

    That said, I also wonder if we need to challenge our underlying assumptions that all suffering is evil. I think the concept of natural evil is unhelpful, because it prescribes (explicitly or implicitly) agency to natural events that simply doesn't exist. (I think I would feel the storm that destroys the house and the neighbour who refuses to help as two different weights). If we build houses on a flood plain, there's no evil in the river coming and washing them away. It's simply doing what rivers do. There is suffering, yes, but not evil. And part of that suffering is our faulty assumption that people ought not to get washed away by rivers. In many cases, we layer suffering upon suffering - the suffering of loss plus the suffering of feeling that we shouldn't be experiencing loss. Perhaps the same is true of the suffering of bodily sickness and death. We add to the physical pain the mental anguish of believing that things should not be this way (as Job did). But, looking through fairy tales and folklore, it's telling that we can rarely envision an immortal, eternally healthy creature that isn't cursed.

    Eden was a world created without suffering. It was a world where humanity were arguably closer to God than at any other time in history (even the disciples only experienced God 'veiled in flesh'). But it was also, to use the language of the essay, incomplete, perhaps more so than the 'wounded' world, and the biblical vision of the final end of all things isn't a return to Eden.

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    1. A thoughtful response; thank you. You've put your finger on what is probably the deepest question the essay raises.

      I think the key distinction is between goodness and completion. I certainly don't mean that an acorn is a bad acorn because it isn't yet an oak, any more than a newborn is a defective human because she isn't yet an adult. Each is wholly good as the kind of thing it presently is. My point is simply that each possesses real capacities that have not yet been actualised. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense I have in mind, "incomplete" means "still ordered towards a fuller realisation of its nature", not "lacking value."

      That also bears on your question about God. God is different precisely because He is pure actuality. He does not become what He is. He simply is. Created beings, by contrast, are finite and receive their perfection over time. That isn't a defect to be corrected so much as a feature of what it means to be a creature rather than the Creator.

      I also agree with your point that many theodicies overstate their case by speaking as though this were the only possible world God could have created. I don't think we can know that. My argument is more modest. It isn't that God had to create a world like this, but that, having freely chosen to create finite, developing creatures rather than fully actualised ones, a world of growth, contingency and vulnerability is no longer surprising. It belongs to the kind of world He chose to make.

      I found your comments about natural evil interesting as well. I think you're right that we often speak rather loosely. A river isn't morally evil; it's simply a river. The suffering is real, but the river has no malice. That's one reason Augustine preferred to think of evil as a privation rather than as some positive thing in creation. So we're closer than we may first appear.

      Where I would hesitate is over the suggestion that "perhaps everything is complete as it is, where it is." I wonder whether that leaves enough room for the biblical picture of creation itself as moving towards a consummation. Scripture begins in a garden but ends in a city. St Paul speaks of creation groaning in labour pains. The final vision isn't simply Eden restored, but creation brought to a fullness it had not previously attained. That seems to suggest that there really is a distinction between a thing being genuinely good at every stage and yet still being on its way to its intended fulfilment.

      Thank you again. Comments like yours help clarify where the argument needs to be sharpened.

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    2. Thank you, it's interesting to bounce ideas around!

      When we say that something 'isn't yet x', I think we have to leave space for those things that 'will never be x.' To continue with the analogies, most acorns never become oak trees, and many foetuses never become adults (or, increasingly, are never even born). But, it God loves us with the same unconditional love from before we were born, and prior to us reaching fulfilment, then there has to be completeness at any stage of development.

      Fundamentally, there's a seeming paradox here. Something can be both complete in itself, and teleologically incomplete, and I don't believe that this invalidates your penultimate paragraph. It's the inability to hold these in tension which I think has led to two major heresies: that of 'total depravity', which overemphasises our incompleteness; and the modernist view that we're all OK as we are and don't need to change or work on ourselves, which overemphasises our completeness (and is, I imagine, a reaction to the former). Both contain truths, but are unbalanced by jettisoning the other side of the coin.

      I do wonder if Augustine's idea of evil as a privation is influenced by his desire to distance himself from his former Manichaean dualism and avoid a Zoroastrian symmetry where evil is a force equivalent to God, and whether he pushes this too far. It seems to me correct only in a very technically narrow way, i.e., that evil cannot create anything. But describing the worst atrocities of recent history as a privation of good feels unsatisfactory.

      I think you're right that the type of world logically arises from the type of creatures that were created to inhabit it. Whether it's the 'best of all possible worlds' depends on what variable we're measuring! Why God chose to make creatures the way he did, we can only speculate.

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    3. You’re up late!

      You've put the paradox rather well: something can be complete in itself and yet teleologically incomplete. In fact, I suspect that is the distinction I was reaching for, and you have stated it more clearly.

      I certainly don't mean that an acorn which never becomes an oak has somehow failed to be good, or that a child who dies young was an unfinished human being in some pejorative sense. Nor does God's love wait for us to achieve some future state before we become worthy of it. The goodness of the creature is present at every stage. But that doesn't mean that the creature has no unrealised possibilities or no proper end towards which it is ordered.

      That may also answer the question of the acorn's “choice”. The acorn does not choose its end; it has a nature which determines the kind of fulfilment proper to it. A human being is stranger. We have a nature, but we are also capable of freely cooperating with or resisting the goods towards which that nature points. Our development is therefore not just biological.

      I think your two examples of theological imbalance are useful. We can so emphasise our incompleteness that we forget the goodness already given, or so emphasise the goodness already given that we forget that grace calls us somewhere. Christianity insists on both. “You are loved as you are” and “you are called to become” are not contradictory propositions.

      I'm also sympathetic to your reservation about “privation”. Augustine's account is philosophically important because it prevents evil from becoming a second principle opposed to God. But saying that evil is a privation does not make atrocities feel any less terrible. The murderer has not just removed some abstract quantity of goodness; he has inflicted an appalling wound upon a person who possesses an irreducible dignity. The metaphysical account and the phenomenology of suffering are answering different questions, and I think we get into trouble when we expect one sentence to do both jobs.

      And yes, I agree that we can only speculate about why God chose to create this particular kind of world. That’s why I was wary throughout the essay of claiming that God had to create a world like this one. I think we can say something about the relationship between the kind of creatures God chose to create and the kind of world in which such creatures can exist. We cannot deduce God's reason for choosing this particular creation.

      Perhaps that is where the title of the essay matters. The wound is real. But so is the crown. The fact that something is genuinely good where it is does not mean that it has nowhere further to go.

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    4. I'm a night owl! That's part of the reason I wouldn't want to live in a monastery, they get up way too early...

      This is an interesting article on Augustine and privation: https://www.catholiccr.org/blog/augustine-on-evil-as-potency-for-privation/

      I think part of my difficulty with Augustine's argument is that it's an incredibly intellectual and hard to bend to fit the reality of evil that we experience. The other problem is that 'evil' is a very broad category and tends to lump together types of harms that I'm not convinced belong together - we've mentioned 'natural' evil, and then there's evil done from ignorance, evil done from delusion, and intentional malice. I don't think these are the same, and privation better fits some than others. I also think there's a danger of denying Satan's power and agency in an attempt to avoid elevating him to God's equal.

      Orthodoxy would agree that evil has no being of its own. St. Athanasius said that nothing exists independently of God's sustaining nature, therefore to exist at all is to participate in God and, to some degree, already be oriented towards godliness. Evil cannot exist in the same way that good exists, it can only be a corruption of the good. It is, as someone wrote 'metaphysically parasitic'. Eschatologically, evil is simply dispelled when goodness is restored, in the same way that darkness disappears when we turn on the light.

      In the icon of the Ladder of Divine Ascent, demons are attempting to drag monks from the ladder as they climb to heaven. I was taught that the fact that these demons are faceless indicates that evil has no power of its own unless we give it that power.

      I don't think these views are substantially different to Augustine's, but that he expresses them in a more technical fashion that it's maybe the failure of my imagination to fully appreciate.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ladder_of_Divine_Ascent_(icon)

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    5. I'm beginning to think we're returning to a distinction that matters quite a lot. Augustine's privation account may be metaphysically right without being, by itself, a sufficient description of evil as we encounter it.

      If I say that a man deliberately tortures another person, "a privation of good" sounds almost offensively bloodless. But if I say that the act is unintelligible except as a corruption of goods that are themselves real - freedom, reason, the human person, the proper ordering of love, then privation begins to look less like an explanation of the whole phenomenon and more like an account of what evil is at the deepest level. It tells us what the parasite is, rather than what it feels like to be bitten by it.

      I think your distinction between ignorance, delusion and malice is helpful here. The moral and psychological histories of those acts are very different, even if they share a metaphysical structure. A man who harms another through ignorance is not morally equivalent to one who delights in his suffering. The privation account can perhaps accommodate both, but it doesn't by itself tell us much about the difference.

      And I wouldn't want to minimise Satan's agency either. There is an important distinction between saying that evil has no independent being and saying that evil has no real agency. A parasite has no life independent of its host, but that hardly makes the parasite imaginary. Christian theology seems quite comfortable holding together both claims: Satan is a creature, therefore radically dependent upon God; and Satan is nevertheless genuinely personal, intelligent and capable of willing evil.

      Your image of the demons on the Ladder is rather striking in that respect. Perhaps the facelessness gets at something that a purely philosophical account can easily miss: evil has no true face of its own. It has to borrow the face of something good (power, justice, loyalty, courage, even love) and twist it. That might explain why evil can appear so frighteningly substantial while remaining, metaphysically speaking, parasitic.

      So perhaps Augustine's mistake, if there is one, is not that privation is wrong but that we can be tempted to let the metaphysical description do more work than it can. "Evil is a privation" is a very good answer to the question what kind of thing is evil? It isn't necessarily an answer to what is it like to encounter evil, why does someone choose it, how does it spread, and why does God permit it?

      And that brings us back, rather neatly, to the theodicy question. We may need several levels of explanation rather than one master theory. Metaphysics can tell us what evil is. Psychology can tell us something about how people become agents of it. Scripture tells us about sin, temptation, judgement and redemption. And the Cross tells us what God actually does about it.

      Perhaps the danger is expecting any one of those accounts to carry the whole weight.

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    6. Yes, I think you're correct. Augustine's argument is an intellectual one, not a pastoral one, and it's a very high-level explanation. It's a bit like going to hospital with a broken leg and being told that pain is a series of electrical signals relayed along a pathway of various neurotransmitters. It's not wrong, but it doesn't help fix your leg.

      I would agree that theodicy is too complex for One Great Theory of Everything. I think it's also worth teasing apart our use of 'evil' to mean 'harm done' (a great evil has befallen me), and 'evil' to mean 'the harm-causing action'. These seem to often get conflated, which further confuses things. I can suffer the same 'evil' (harm) - e.g., a broken leg - from having a rock fall on me, falling off my bike because I'm being reckless, being hit by a car accidentally, or being assaulted. The harm is the same in each case, but the (moral) evil isn't.

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  2. Sorry, HJ, but this is LONG! I'm 1/4 the way through and I don't when I'll find time to finish it. But the subject is a tricky one. For instance:
    "Adam was created not defective but capable of growth into the destiny prepared for him." Surely he was headed for his 'destiny' in any case, and 'capability' is not a relevant issue. I'm not a fan of theological determinism and am still wondering how it could possible fit into a Christian worldview.

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    1. No need to apologise! And I think your objection gets to an important point.

      I certainly don't mean that Adam was determined to reach his destiny regardless of what he chose. That would make the language of growth, freedom and even sin rather difficult to make sense of. I mean that God created him for a destiny, but that reaching it involved a genuinely free response to God. Capability matters precisely because the creature is not a finished product whose future is simply being played out.
      So I would distinguish between destiny and determinism. God can know the end without compelling the creature's route to it. In fact, the Catholic understanding of providence explicitly holds God's eternal plan together with our free response.

      That's probably a distinction I should have made more explicitly in the essay. A future essay will cover it

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  3. Is HJ, or anybody else here, aware of the case of Sarah Morse, the Roman Catholic teacher who was sacked from her job in Abroath for answering students' questions about her pro-choice/life stances?

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    1. I believe she's going to an employment tribunal at the end of August. If her claims are true, she isn't the first person to be sacked for holding Christian beliefs, so I doubt the result of the tribunal will make much difference. Being a Christian seems to be the one 'protected characteristic' that isn't particularly protected.

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    2. Ok, we will see what transpires. It would be nice to hear some public voices raised in her favour, but I guess that one doesn't hold one's breath for that these days.

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  4. RE "The mystery of evil is not resolved"

    There is no mystery of evil. Evil has always been in plain sight for everyone and is no mystery. There's only a lack of knowledge, true understanding, and mostly a willful decision to not acknowledge what's in plain sight or a denial of reality (of what's in plain sight).

    Therefore, there is no objective need (but heaps of popular subjective self-serving WANT) to use fabricated ABSTRACT OTHERWORLDLY notions such as “satan” or “the devil” or "lucifer" to explain evilness on earth.

    "I've come to realize that the biggest problem anywhere in the world is that people's perceptions of reality are compulsively filtered through the screening mesh of WHAT THEY WANT, AND DO NOT WANT, TO BE TRUE." --- Travis Walton, Author

    Evil on earth, which DOES exist abundantly, is explained coherently by EARTH-BOUND true reality, by GENUINELY acknowledging the 2 married human pink elephants in the room... https://www.rolf-hefti.com/covid-19-coronavirus.html (again, there's no objective need, only subjective want, for OTHERwordly "mysterious" mythical concepts). But...

    "The masses have never thirsted after truth. They turn aside from evidence that is not to their taste, preferring to deify error, if error seduces them. Whoever can supply them with illusions is easily their master; whoever attempts to destroy their illusions is always their victim." --- Gustave Le Bon, in 1895

    "Growing up means realizing that none of the worst villains are in prison." --- Caitlin Johnstone, Independent Journalist (https://archive.ph/zDqoh)

    Illusions and fantasies have only ever distracted GENUINE truth-seekers from the true evil and so "spiritual" ideologies and religions (fantasies) have been helping to MAINTAIN evil on earth for thousands of years... The cited article above explains how this has come about, and continues...

    Without the right understanding, and whole acknowledgment, of the true WHOLE problem and reality, no real constructive LASTING change is possible for humanity. And if you do NOT acknowledge and recognize the WHOLE truth YOU are helping to prevent this from happening..

    "Ignorance is the root cause of all Evil. Since only Knowledge eradicates ignorance, it is our duty and moral obligation to educate ourselves, as well as the masses around us." --- Anonymous

    Speaking of ignorance is evil, how can the masses get out of this whole mess (and create justice, freedom and peace for all)? First, EVERYONE needs to learn, and teach others, what TRUE morality is ---99% of people don't know what it is because (1) it's NOT taught in the official indoctrination system, better know as the "education system," and (2) it's NOT the same as religious morality: https://odysee.com/@woeih:e/Mark-Passio-Government-Is-Slavery:a

    Because if you don't know what TRUE morality is you will not stop doing, unwittingly or wittingly, evil things...

    "The solution is NOT to create something new (eg, new systems of organization, new technologies, etc). The solution is to STOP being complicit with evil. To STOP doing things that are not moral for a reward. To STOP being complicit with anything the control system tells us we must do." --- Mark Passio, Spiritual Teacher

    "As financial access, employment, and administration become conditional on algorithmic systems, freedom does not disappear through overt coercion, but through participation that is scored, filtered, and managed." --- Mark Keenan, Dec 2025 [https://www.globalresearch.ca/ai-operating-system-digital-totalitarianism/5909796]

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    1. @Chuck,
      Sorry, but I do not concur that ignorance is the root cause of all Evil. Some of the smartest people I've known have shown the strongest tendency toward that end of the spectrum.

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    2. @ Anonymous

      Re: "I do not concur that ignorance is the root cause of all Evil. Some of the smartest people I've known have shown the strongest tendency toward that end of the spectrum."

      You're equating intelligence with non-ignorance twisting and mutilating the original claim. It's easy to see why your ad hoc erected fake comparison is false --- the criminal ruling authorities anywhere are people of the highest intelligence (ie IQ) yet they're among the most evil human beings and always have been. Highly intelligent beings who do evil things are ignorant because they "think" their actions do not have consequences, and they're ignorant about the fact that their perennial evil behavior is self-destructive ultimately.

      Your incorrect misleading comparison is in itself an example of ignorance. Or, you could be a troll or a deceitful AI bot that uses deliberately a strawman argument to laughable "invalidate" the original statement and to misdirect or distract the readers here away from Chuck's incisive points.

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    3. Chuck, you're answering a different question from the one my essay is asking.

      Nobody needs Satan to explain why a man commits murder, why governments become corrupt, or why people rationalise doing terrible things. We can observe greed, fear, ignorance, malice, ideology and self-interest perfectly well without invoking anything supernatural. But that isn't what is meant by the mystery of evil.

      The mystery is not "Why do bad things happen?" but something closer to: why is there evil at all in a world created and sustained by a good God, and why does rational freedom so often turn against the good it can recognise? Human psychology can give us plenty of proximate explanations. It doesn't settle the metaphysical question.

      And I'm not persuaded that "ignorance is the root of all evil" solves even the human problem. Some people do terrible things because they genuinely don't understand the good. Others do terrible things precisely because they understand what they're doing and want it anyway. More knowledge does not necessarily produce more virtue. If it did, university campuses would be remarkably peaceful places.

      As for Satan, Christianity does not posit Satan as a rival deity or as a convenient explanation for everything unpleasant. Satan, too, is a creature. The Christian claim is that evil has no independent existence of its own, whilst also being something creatures can genuinely choose and perpetrate. Whether one accepts that claim is another matter. Rejecting it requires more than pointing out that humans are capable of evil.

      So, I think we're dealing with two different questions. You are asking how human evil operates. My essay is asking what evil ultimately is, why a good God permits a world in which it is possible, and what God does about it.

      Those questions overlap, but they aren't the same question. And solving the first doesn't make the second disappear.

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    4. Wickham, the difficulty is that you've expanded "ignorance" until it means anything that might explain why someone does evil.

      If an intelligent person knows that an act is wrong, understands its likely consequences, and deliberately does it anyway, calling him "ignorant" because he has failed to understand the ultimate consequences of his actions doesn't really explain anything. It simply redefines his moral failure as ignorance.

      Christian moral theology has always recognised that ignorance is only one possible source of wrongdoing. People can act from ignorance, certainly. They can also act from fear, passion, self-interest, habit, resentment, ideological conviction, or deliberate malice. Sometimes the problem is not that we don't know the good. It is that we know it and don't want it.

      That's why I find the distinction between knowing the good and willing the good rather important.

      And that, incidentally, is much closer to the question my essay is asking. I'm not claiming that Satan is needed to explain why a particular criminal commits a particular crime. I'm asking a much larger theological question about the existence, nature and persistence of evil in a world created by a good God.

      You may reject the Christian answer, of course. Explaining human wrongdoing in terms of psychology, ignorance and social structures doesn't actually answer the theological question. It answers a different one.

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    5. Happy Jack...

      In terms of: "The mystery is not "Why do bad things happen?" but something closer to: why is there evil at all in a world created and sustained by a good God"

      The question is easily answer IF someone operates in and prioritizes reality. The evidence-based reality is that the fact of an astronomical magnitude of pain and suffering in the world, going on for millennia, ENTIRELY NEGATES AND INVALIDATES the self-serving claim, self-centered dogma, or comfortable delusion that there is a LOVING "God"! In fact, it's clear obvious evidence that such a "God" is a total psychopath!

      Religious people start and END with the presumption, dogma, programmed belief, delusion, fantasy that there's a "loving God." It's disseminated as objective fact, as real science, as an irrefutable unquestionable fact. Someone said once that "Science is the journey toward the truth. Religion is pretending you are already there." That's why religion is a VERY convenient non-scientific belief, VERY self-serving because it EXCLUDES questioning itself and its dogmas, claims, delusions.

      Religious people operate in unreality and prioritize unreality/fantasies. Therefore they mindlessly BELIEVE, contrary to the planetary evidence in front of their faces, "their" "God" is loving. It's dogma over reality, fantasy over reality, willful ignorance over truth. This unreality-based or ignorance-based non-thinking (ie delusion, lunacy) inevitably creates an "unanswerable" FAKE "mystery of evil"! An absurdity!

      Many thinkers had of course talked about the absurdity of religion a long time ago because religion is about having "faith" to believe in things that don't make sense, such as the non-reality-based lunatic yet HIGHLY SELF-SERVING belief of a "loving God."

      If you start with unreality/ignorance you cannot get reality. If you start with untruth/ignorance of truth you can't get to truth. So the religious or metaphysical "mystery" of evil is a FABRICTED construct, a bogus artifact, a type of deception, an UNreality. One cannot genuinely answer an unreality/fantasy.

      In terms of: "More knowledge does not necessarily produce more virtue. If it did, university campuses would be remarkably peaceful places."
      Here too, you START out (and end with?) with a false programmed belief: universities are centers of TRUE knowledge. They are not and never have been. They've always been politics-based indoctrination camps of the societies run by a group of criminal psychopaths, inculcating its members with the biased beliefs (selective knowledge) that serve the sick culture and its controllers. The Global Planned Covid High Crime made that most obvious ONCE MORE TIME (https://www.globalresearch.ca/western-universities-sold-their-souls-during-engineered-pandemic/5837468), yet ONE MORE TIME virtually everyone ignores it as they are still stuck in their deep indoctrinated beliefs (programmed lies). Your FALSE belief in universities is a manifestation of ignorance, whether wittingly or unwittingly.

      So, UNLIKE what you think ("I think we're dealing with two different questions"), we are NOT dealing with two different questions at all because all comes down to ignorance, willful or unwilful, and that it's at the core of much, if not all, evil.

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  5. Much food for thought, both in the article and in the comments.

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